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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-MAINTENANCE AND CURE-SuccESSIVE SHIPOWNER-EMPLOYERs EQUALLY LIABLE TO SEA AN FOR INJURIES INCURRED

DURING FIRST EMPLOYMENT AND AGGRAVATED DURING SECOND

EMPLOYMENT-A seaman who had injured his back in an accident
aboard a vessel owned by Texaco, Inc. subsequently aggravated that
injury in the normal course of his new employment with the Sinclair
Refining Company. The seaman libeled Sinclair and Texaco separately to recover maintenance and cure for the disability occasioned
by the aggravation of the prior injury, and Sinclair impleaded
Texaco in the action against it. The two actions were consolidated for trial and the district court awarded the seaman a full
recovery against Sinclair, but allowed Sinclair full indemnity against
Texaco. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
vacated the indemnification award and remanded the case for further proceedings holding that Sinclair was not entitled to full indemnification unless the original injury aboard the Texaco vessel
resulted from Texaco's negligence or the unseaworthiness of its
ship; in the absence of such a showing, Texaco and Sinclair would
be required to share equally the obligation to pay the seaman maintenance and cure. Gooden v. Sinclair Refining Co., 378 F.2d 576
(3d Cir. 1967).
Seamen have traditionally been regarded as "wards of the
admiralty," and have, therefore, enjoyed the paternalistic favor
of the courts." One of the benefits which has accrued to them is
the protection afforded.by the ancient doctrine of maintenance and
cure 2 which is tantamount to a judicially imposed "system of acciI Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (No. 6047) (C.CD. Me. 1823) :
"Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the
rights of seamen, because they are unprotected and need counsel, because
they are thoughtless and require indulgence; because they are credulous
and complying; and are easily overreached." See also Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287
U.S. 2 367, 377 (1932).
The concept of affording seamen special protection is approximately
2500 years old. Note, The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal
Injury Remedies, 57 YALE L.J. 243, 247 (1947).
The Anglo-American
theory of maintenance and cure can be traced to the twelfth century Laws
of Oleron, reprinted in Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. Cas. 426, 428 (No. 11,641)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1832). See generally appendix 30 F. Cas. 1171 (1897). The
traditional reason for giving seamen this remedy was outlined by Mr.
Justice Story in Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (No. 6047) (C.C.D.
Me. 1823):
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour.
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dent and health insurance ... ." 3 By this doctrine a seaman is
entitled to maintenance, which is "sustenance and a berth while
aboard ship and the payment in cash to the ill or injured seaman
the cost of his board and lodging while ashore actually expended
by him for the liability which he incurred," 4 and cure, which is such
medical treatment as is necessary to treat the seaman r if he "'falls
sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship,' if such misfortune
attacks him while he is attached to the ship as part of her crew." 6
It is not necessary that the illness or injury be the result of anyone's negligence, 7 or that it be caused by the seaman's work or
employment 8 All that is required is that the seaman become disabled during his period of employment. This requirement has
been construed to mean merely that he be in the service of the
ship at the time the disability arises ;9 and, to be in the service of
the ship, the seaman need only be on call for duty. 0 Following
this broad construction, the United States Supreme Court has
declared that a seaman may be entitled to maintenance and cure
even though injured while off the ship for personal reasons."
The courts have rarely denied a seaman maintenance and
cure, generally allowing him the benefit of any doubt. 12 Virtually
the only way a seaman's claim for maintenance and cure may be
defeated is for the shipowner to show that the injury or illness
They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross
indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. If some provision be not
made for them in sickness at the expense of the ship, they must often
in foreign ports suffer the accumulated evils of disease, and poverty,
and sometimes perish for the want of suitable nourishment. . . . Beyond this, is the great public policy of preserving this important class
of citizens for the commercial service and maritime defense of the
nation.
3 G. Gu.xoa & C. L. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIrALTY § 6-6, at 254
(1957).
4 M. NoRRs, MAITIME PERSONAL IxijumEs § 13 (2d ed. 1966).
G
Raymond v. The Ella S. Thayer, 40 F. 902, 904 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
6
The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 647
(1917).
7 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938); Smith v.
Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 105 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
604 (1939); Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo.
1965); Perdikouris v. S.S. Olympos, 196 F. Supp. 849 (E.D. Va. 1961).
s Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 577 (1941); Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261, 263
(S.D.N.Y.
1965).
0
See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951) ; The Osceola, 189
U.S. 0 153, 175 (1903).
1 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949); The Bouker No. 2,
241 F. 831, 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 647 (1917); Hunt v. The
Trawler Brighton, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 300 (D. Mass. 1952).
"Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
12 Dragich v. Strika, 309 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1962); Diddlebock v. Alcoa
S.S. Co., 234 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1964).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 42

was caused by the seaman's own willful or gross misconduct, or
13
was the result of insubordination or disobedience to orders.
Problems of indemnity and contribution for maintenance and
cure payments arise out of the fact that the obligation to pay
maintenance and cure is a continuing one." Unlike most actions
to recover money, lump sum payments are not sufficient to satisfy
the obligation to pay maintenance and cure.' 5 A shipowner is required to maintain and care for the disabled seaman until he has
reached a maximum recovery or cure.:" And it is well settled
that the mere fact that a seaman obtains subsequent employment
does not terminate his right to maintenance and cure.' 7 Consequently, it is possible for a shipowner to hire a seaman who is still
entitled to payments from a prior employer.' 8
This continuing liability has created difficulties where the seaman, after obtaining employment with a second shipowner, aggra13 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Rolph Navigation & Coal Co. v. Kohilas,
299 F. 52, 55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 614 (1924); Peterson v.
The Chandos, 4 F. 645, 651 (D. Ore. 1880).
'1

Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F2d 690, 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313

U.S. 577 (1941).
'5

Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).

16Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962);

Farrell v. United

States, 336 U.S. 511, 517 (1949); Wilson v. United States, 229 F.2d 277,
280 (2d Cir. 1956); Diddlebock v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 235 F. Supp. 811, 814

(E.D. Pa. 1964). The issue of exactly how long after the voyage a shipowner might have to pay maintenance and cure was in doubt until 1938.
In The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), the leading American case on maintenance and cure, the Court stated that when "a seaman falls sick, or is
wounded, in the service of the ship, [the shipowner is liable] to the extent
of his maintenance and cure, and wages, at least so long as the voyage is
continued." Id. at 175. The question of whether it was the obligation to
pay maintenance and cure that terminated at the end of the voyage, or
only the obligation to pay the seaman his wages, was finally settled in
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). There the Court, faced
with a seaman afflicted with an incurable disease, held that the obligation
to pay maintenance and cure extended beyond the end of the voyage for
such a period of time as may be necessary "to effect such improvement in
the seaman's condition as reasonably may be expected. . . ...Id. at 530.
:17Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Permanente S.S. Corp. v.
Martinez, 369 F.2d 297, 298-99 (9th Cir. 1966); Yates v Dann, 223 F.2d
64 (2d Cir. 1955); Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690, 693 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 577 (1941).
Is A seaman who has become disabled and therefore entitled to maintenance and cure is eligible for free medical services at a United States Public
Health Service Hospital, during which time he does not receive actual payments from the shipowner. M. Nomuus, MAITIME PERSONAL INJURIEs § 13
(2d ed. 1966). These hospitals issue fitness for duty slips, and it is the
general practice of shipowners not to hire a seaman unless he possesses
such a slip. But it is well settled that the fact that a seaman is declared
fit for duty and possesses such a slip is not conclusive as to whether he is
still entitled to maintenance and cure. Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp.
261, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See Koslusky v. United States, 208 F.2d 957
(2d. Cir. 1953).
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rates a prior injury. It has long been held that the aggravation
of a prior injury" or the reactivation of a pre-existing illness,
including a pre-existing latent condition, 20 will give rise to the present
shipowner's duty to pay maintenance and cure. The only requirement in such cases is that the aggravation or reactivation result
from some activity while in the service of the ship. 21 Thus, where
the seaman aggravates his condition while employed on a second
ship, a situation arises in which two employers may be liable for
the seaman's maintenance and cure for the same disability.
It should be noted, however, that two distinct situations may
give rise to this dual liability depending upon how the injury
aboard the first ship occurred, i.e., the original injury may have
been caused by the shipowner's negligence or the unseaworthiness
of his vessel or by a fortuitous accident occasioned by no negligence
or unseaworthiness. Although the cause of the injury may vary,
the obligation to pay maintenance and cure nevertheless arises,
since it attaches irrespective of culpability. 22 However, the cause
of the injury may give rise to additional problems concerning
primary liability.
Maintenance and cure is but one of three remedies available to the seaman as the result of a maritime injury; the
other two are actions for unseaworthiness, or for negligence
(a cause of action under the Jones Act) .23 Both the unseaworthiness claim and a claim under the Jones Act sound in tort 24 and,
therefore, the seaman is required to elect his remedy; he may not
19See Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959)
(pre-existing tubercular condition); United States v. Robinson, 170 F.2d
578 (5th Cir. 1948) (pre-existing arteriosclerosis condition); Diaz v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (pre-existing asthmatic condition); Arvanitis v. Bassa Transp. Corp., 183 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (pre-existing back injury); White v. Campbell, 96 F. Supp. 195
(W.D.
Pa. 1951) (pre-existing arthritic condition).
20

See Renner v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (re-

activation of tubercular condition); Albano v. United States, 98 F. Supp.
15021(D. Mass. 1951) (latent psychoneurotic condition).
See Miller v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 98 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 641 (1938); Brown v. Dravo Corp., 157 F. Supp.

265 (W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 258 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 960 (1959); Capurro v. The All America, 106 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.Y.
1952).2
223 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938).

La Fontaine v. The G.M. McAllister, 101 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). See generally Comment, Seamen's Injuries: The Jones Act, Unseaworthiness, and Maintenance and Cure-The Siamese Triplets, 51 CAWzS. L.
RnV. 412 (1963). The cause of action for unseaworthiness is a traditional
maritime remedy, see The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), whereas the negligence action is statutory, see 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1964)
(popularly
known as the Jones Act).
24
Smith v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S Co., 105 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939).
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recover for both.25 On the other hand, no election need be made
between either of these tort actions and maintenance and cure, for
they are considered consistent cumulative remedies. 2 This rule has
been justified on the basis that unseaworthiness or Jones Act
actions sound in tort, whereas the courts have traditionally viewed
27
an action to recover maintenance and cure as sounding in contract.
As was stated by Mr. Justice Story in Hardenv. Gordon,2 8 prompt29
ing the acceptance of maintenance and cure by the American bar,
maintenance and cure "constitutes, in contemplation of the law,
a part of the contract for wages, and is a material ingredient in
the compensation for the labour and services of the seaman." ao
This implied contract 31 may not be abrogated by the parties 32 and
has provided broad remedial powers to compensate the seaman for
his medical expenses. But, although the seaman may pursue both
his remedies in tort and contract, he may not obtain a double
recovery, 3 the possibility of which arises because a recovery for
either unseaworthiness or negligence may include compensation for
the same expenses covered by an award for maintenance and cure.3 4
Where two employers are involved, the difficulties inherent in allocating financial responsibility for the same disability are manifest.
This is the wellspring of problems concerning the right to indemnification or contribution among shipowners where both are liable
for what may be, in effect, maintenance and cure.
The issue of the respective liabilities of successive shipowners
to pay maintenance and cure to a single seaman has never been
25

Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928).

The Jones

Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages. . .

."

41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1961).

Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928); Smith v.
Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 105 F.2d 604, 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
26

U.S. 604 (1939).
27 Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
28 11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
2

9 G. GiLMoRE & C. L. BLACK, THE LAW OF AmrnAi.-ry

§ 6-6, at 253

(1957).
30 Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 481 (No. 6047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932).
33 Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 1961); Bartholomew
v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1960).
3 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16 (1964); Baltimore
S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). The court stated, in McCarthy
v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 911 (1950), that
when an injured seaman recovers full damages in an action for
indemnity based upon unseaworthiness and negligence in which he has
claimed loss of wages including the value of the board and lodging
which form a part thereof and medical expenses, if any, he has
thereby recovered the maintenance and cure to which he is entitled
up to the time of trial, at least.
31Aguilar
32
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directly before the courts. However, some direction may be obtained from the analagous issue of shipowner indemnification from
third-party tort-feasors for maintenance and cure payments to seamen whose injuries are precipitated by the third-party's tort.35 This
situation is similar to one in which a second shipowner is compelled to pay maintenance and cure to a seaman who aggravates
an injury originally incurred on another ship due to negligence or
the unseaworthiness of that ship.
The right of a shipowner to indemnification and recovery of
maintenance and cure payments from third-party tort-feasors is
uncertain due to two circuit court of appeals decisions, The Federal
No. 2 36 and Jones v. Waterman Steamship Co.,37 which reached
opposite conclusions on this issue. In The Federal No. 2,' 8 where
indemnification was denied, a seaman employed on libelant's barge
bad been injured in a collision negligently caused by the tug
Federal No. 2. The barge owner libeled the Federal No. 2 to
recover hospital and other expenses which it had paid pursuant
to its obligation to maintain and care for the seaman. The court,
relying on the traditional concept of maintenance and cure as a
contractual obligation, concluded that "Itlhe cause of the responsibility is the contract; the tort is the remote occasion." 31 Consequently, the court held that the payments made to cure the seaman were a personal obligation, subject to a contingency, "and the
law does not predicate liability upon the party occasioning a contingency contemplated in [the] contract of employment." 40 The
only means perceived by the court by which a libelant in such a
situation might recover damages was if there were either some
express statutory provision or contractual right of subrogation
present.
In Jones v. Waterman Steamship Co., 41 which allowed indemnification, a seaman who had been on shore leave was walking
on the pier to which libelant's ship was moored and, when the
lights suddenly went out, fell into an open ditch along a railroad
siding owned and operated by the Reading Railroad. The seaman,
after instituting a common-law negligence action against the rail3

,See generally G. GrLmoRl

& C. L. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY

§§6-14 to 6-18 (1957).
3621 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927).

37 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
38 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927).

:9Id. at 314. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S.
303, 309 (1927), where the Court states:
as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one
man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because
the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown
to the doer of the wrong.... The law does not spread its protection

so far.

40 The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313, 314 (2d Cir. 1927).

41 155 F2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
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road and settling for $750.00, instituted an action to recover maintenance and cure from his employer, Waterman, who in turn impleaded the railroad seeking indemnification. The court, after disposing of Waterman's allegation that the release given by the seaman to the railroad barred his action against it for maintenance
and cure, 42 proceeded to hold the railroad liable to indemnify Waterman for any maintenance and cure which it would have to pay
the seaman. In contrast to the court in The Federal No. 2, the
Jones court viewed the relationship between the ship and seaman
as an exceptional "status," to be likened to that of parent and
child or husband and wife.43 Therefore, as in those cases where
the parent or husband is entitled to indemnity for expenses incurred on the child's or wife's behalf, the shipowner should be indemnified by the tort-feasor
for maintenance and cure payments
44
to the injured seaman.

While the division on this particular issue has persisted, with
both Jones v.Waterman Steamship Co.45 and The Federal No. 2,46
providing precedent, it should be noted that the disputed question
of law in those cases was whether a shipowner has an independent
cause of action for indemnification against the third-party tort-feasor
for maintenance and cure payments. The law seems settled, however,
that, if the seaman sues both the tort-feasor and the shipowner in the
same action as co-defendants, the obligation of the tort-feasor to
fully compensate the seaman is primary, whereas the shipowner's

421d. at 995-96.
The court held that, although a release of one joint
tort-feasor would release the other, since the obligation of Waterman did not
sound in tort whereas the railroad's did, the release did not affect the
seaman's right to recover maintenance and cure from Waterman.
-3 The court in The Federal No. 2 believed that the parent-child and
husband-wife relationships were a social condition which, because of their
natural existence and unity, a tort-feasor is perforce aware of. Such did
not exist according to the court in the seaman-ship relationship. It was
solely contractual, not really different from the employer-employee relationship. 21 F2d 313, 314 (2d Cir. 1927).
44 155 F.2d at 1000-01:
"We prefer to impose a higher degree of dignity
upon the ship-seaman relationship, awarding to it a status or a 'social condition' in excess of that given under the ruling in The Federal No. 2."
Id. at 1001. The court's view that the seaman stands in a special relation
to the ship is a logical conclusion to be drawn from the very reasons for
affording seamen such protection and is not without precedent. See Powery
v. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 280 F. 726 (S.D. Ala. 1922).
a5 See Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.
1962) (dictum); Valentine v. Wiggins, 242 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.C. 1965);
Pure Oil Co. v. Geotechnical Corp., 129 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1955);
Babellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
46See H-10 Water Taxi Co. v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.
Cal. 1966); Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 435 (D.
Mass. 1954); Irwin v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1953);
Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271 (Tex Civ.
App. 1957).

1968]

RECENT DECISIONS

obligation to pay maintenance and cure is but secondary.47 The
basic concept is that the seaman may not receive a double recovery.48
These considerations have led to the well-settled rule that although
prior recovery from the tort-feasor does not bar the seaman from
an action against the shipowner, the shipowner may set off against
his maintenance and cure liability any items which constitute a
part of maintenance and cure already recovered from the tortfeasor.4 9 The existence of these rules has led to the conclusion
that to deny indemnification in instances where the shipowner has
paid maintenance and cure prior to an action by the seaman against
the tort-feasor, as occurred in The Federal No. 2, unfairly relieves
the wrongdoer.5 0
As previously stated, there is no clear rule of law which would
govern the situation of successive shipowner liability for maintenance and cure where the first shipowner tortiously caused the
seaman's injuries; nor do analogous cases supply a definitive solution. However, one court has concerned itself with an attempt to
allocate responsibility for maintenance and cure between two shipowners where the injuries caused the seaman on the first ship were
not caused by the tortious conduct of its owner. In Pyles v.
American Trading & Production Corp.,51 a seaman injured his back
while on the defendant's ship, subsequently obtained employment
on a second vessel and was reinjured. The second ship paid him
maintenance and cure for his disability resulting from the reinjury.
Nonetheless, the seaman libeled the first shipowner to recover maintenance and cure for the entire period, dating from the original
injury.5 2 The court held that if he reimbursed the second shipowner for the amount received as maintenance and cure he could
recover fully from the first. Since the second shipowner was not
a party to the litigation it cannot be authoritatively said that the
court would have done the same in an action in which he was a
party. The case is significant, however, in that the court sanctioned a process whereby, provided the seaman does not obtain a
double recovery, he may determine who shall bear the ultimate

- The Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1930); Seely v. City of
New York, 24 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1928); Thibeault v. Boston Towboat Co.,
28 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1939), aff'd sub norm., Mystic Terminal Co. v.
Thibeault, 108 F.2d 813 (1st Cir. 1940); Sillanpa v. Cornell S.S. C.,
1954 A.M.C. 1189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
IsSee Muise v. Abbott, 160 F.2d 590, 592 (1st Cir. 1947).
-1 Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass.

1954).
50 G GumsoRE & C. L. BLAcx,
(1957).

THE

LAW oF ArnmALT

§ 6-18, at 277

51244 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Tex. 1965), rezd on other grounds, 372 F.2d

611 (5th Cir. 1967).
52 The seaman's libel also alleged unseaworthiness and negligence on the
part of the first ship, but the jury found against him on these issues.
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liability,
without any consideration of the shipowners' rights inter
53
sese.
In the instant case, Gooden v. Sinclair Refining Co.,- the
court was required to determine the liability of two successive
shipowners who were being libeled for maintenance and cure. The
ultimate claim was for the period of disability following the aggravation of the seaman's back condition, originally occasioned on
Texaco's vessel. The aggravation, which occurred while the seaman was employed on the second ship (Sinclair), was not caused
by any accident, whereas the original injury was. The lower court,
faced with two separate suits consolidated for trial, with Sinclair
impleading Texaco in the suit against it, had awarded the seaman
judgments against both shipowners. However, because of the
double recovery problem, the judgment against Texaco was not
entered. 55 Without determining whether Texaco had breached any
legal duty owed the seaman in causing the original injury, the
district court held Texaco liable to indemnify Sinclair for all
maintenance and cure payments to the seaman, from which judgment Texaco appealed.
In analyzing the problem of indemnification the court reviewed the respective liabilities of the two shipowners. The obligation of Sinclair, the second shipowner, to pay the seaman maintenance and cure was not appealed. Texaco, however, took the
position that when the contingent obligation to pay maintenance
and cure descended upon Sinclair, i.e., when it hired the seaman,
its own liability ceased. The court was of the opinion that the
seaman's subsequent employment by another shipowner was not
controlling in determining when Texaco's obligation ceased. Texaco
was obligated to pay until the seaman was cured, and the fact of
subsequent employment was of only evidentiary value on the issue
of the seaman's recovery from his injury.56 Since the district
court had determined that the libelant had not been cured, it was
concluded that the seaman was entitled to payments from either
shipowner, with a prohibition, however, against double recovery.
The court then considered the lower court's holding that, due to
equitable considerations, the total liability should fall upon the
shipowner upon whose vessel the original accident occurred. Noting
that no determination had been made by the lower court upon the
issue of fault or breach of duty, the court held that
the mere fact that the disability was caused by an accident on .
[Texaco's] ship rather than on another vessel should not be the basis
53
See also Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Cf. Permanente S.S. Corp. v. Martinez, 369 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1966).
54378 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1967).
55 Gooden v. Texaco, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
56 378 F.2d at 579.
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for placing upon Texaco the entire maintenance and cure obligation
for
57
the period when its obligation was coextensive with Sinclair's.
The court then, based on its own views of the equities, concluded
that where no fault could be placed on the prior shipowner the
two shipowners should share the liability equally.
The court then turned to the problem of the respective shipowners' liability if the seaman's original injury had been caused
by the first shipowner's negligence or the unseaworthiness of his
vessel. No determination had been made by the district court on
this issue. Noting prior case law, which had established the
prnciple that where a seaman joins two defendants in a suit, asking
amages of one and maintenance and cure of the other, the defendant liable for damages is primarily liable to the seaman, whereas the other is only secondarily liable, the court stated:
It would thus appear to be equitable to allow Sinclair, the shipowner
which paid the seaman maintenance and cure, to seek exoneration
from Texaco to the extent of the seaman's damages rights (if any)
against Texaco. s
Noting the analogous situations dealt with in The Federal No.
2," and Jones v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,60 but declining to
follow either, the court declared that it was within its equity
powers as a court sitting in admiralty to compel indemnification:
And the relief here proposed is designed to achieve the equitable result
of assuring that the ultimate liability of shipowners remains the same
regardless of how seamen choose or happen to seek recovery.01
The court was unimpressed by the argument that the granting of
indemnity here might lead to multiple litigation, believing that the
interests of uniformity
and consistency in placing ultimate liability
62
must prevail.
63
The court distinguished Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp.,
in which the United States Supreme Court had declared that to
allow contribution among joint tort-feasors in non-collision maritime cases would impinge on legislative policy since Congress had
entered the area and had not provided for such contribution. There
the Supreme Court was dealing with longshoremen and their em64
ployers, the liability of the latter having been limited by statute.
Id. at 580.
US Id.at 581.
5921 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927).
60 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
61 378 F.2d at 582.
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To compel contribution by the employer in that case would increase
his liability in contravention of the statute. Here, on the other
hand, the court was dealing with an existing liability, and to compel
contribution or indemnification would in no way increase it.6 5 Consequently the district court's judgment was vacated, and the case
was remanded for further consideration on the issue of the first
shipowner's possible breach of duty to the seaman.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case has
accomplished, through the use of its equity powers as an admiralty
court, 8 what it had previously attempted in Jones v. Waterman
Steamship Corp. 7 However, that case was somewhat tarnished by
the subsequent reversal of a case upon which the court had greatly
relied in its rationale," and has, therefore, been somewhat unpersuasive in its attack upon the conceptual fiction of maintenance and
cure as a contract between ship and seaman.6 9
The theory,
espoused by the court in The Federal No. 2, that the relationship
between the seaman and the shipowner is essentially one of contract, and therefore the owner cannot object when required to perform the obligation he has undertaken, certainly has some historical
validity. The court in the principal case, however, by equitably
allowing indemnification and contribution, has necessarily rejected
the contract theory.
In disregarding this legal fiction the
court has placed maintenance and cure on sounder footing.
Maintenance and cure should be viewed for what it is, a judicially
imposed strict liability not dependent on contract whatsoever7 0
which, like statutory workmen's compensation, depends upon the
vwill of its originator for the effect of its provisions. 7 The instant
case is a realistic acceptance of that fact and an attempt by the
court to administer its own creation in an equitable manner not
inconsistent with its purposes.
5378 F.2d at 583.
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Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959).
67 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
68United States v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1945),
rev'd, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
69 See Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 435 (D. Mass.

1954). But see Pure Oil Co. v. Geotechnical Corp., 129 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.
La. 701955).
Powery v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 280 F. 726, 727 (S.D. Ala. 1922).

71For this reason it is manifest that the fact that Congress has not

enacted legislation to provide for a right of subrogation, contribution or
indemnification is irrelevant. Cases holding that such is necessary before one

may recoup payments made under workmen's compensation and other similar

legislation are by no means controlling since in those instances the legislatures
imposed the obligation and chose not to provide for such remedies. See Crab

Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.Zd 277 (4th Cir.

1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941). In fact, if anything, they illustrate
the point that the courts are free to act since Congress has not entered the

area.
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The decision serves additionally to lighten the burden placed
on shipowners for maintenance and cure without abrogating the
benefits to the seaman or shifting that burden to any party not
deserving the obligation. By allowing full indemnification against
a prior shipowner whose culpability has precipitated the second
shipowner's liability, the court affirms and applies traditional rules
of fault liability. It also coincides with the almost universal policy
of workmen's compensation to allow the innocent employer to
72
place the burden of his obligation upon the culpable individual.
And by allowing contribution where neither shipowner is guilty
of any culpable misconduct the court spreads the burden throughout the industry so as to do the least harm to an individual shipowner. The court recognized that if the single shipowner must
bear the obligation, he will be unable to pass the cost on to his
customers and remain in a competitive position in the industry.
Since he has not been guilty of misconduct towards his employee,
it would seem inequitable to place him at a competitive disadvantage.
The court has taken a step which hopefully will lead to the
ultimate demise of such cases as The Federal No. 2. The doctrine
of maintenance and cure is an ancient one which, although forward-looking at its inception (having antedated modem workmen's
compensation laws by hundreds of years), has been applied without regard to changing times. The thrust of modern social legislation is to compensate the injured employee regardless of fault;
but the purpose is to compensate the injured, not to do away with
the concept of fault. 73 That maintenance and cure, which is, in
effect, maritime workmen's compensation, should do away with
the concept of fault liability solely because of an outdated need
to neatly pigeonhole legal concepts
into readily cognizable causes
74
of action is totally unjustifiable.
Unlike workmen's compensation programs which are the creations of legislatures, maintenance and cure is a creation of the
admiralty courts. As such, those courts ought to seek to apply
the doctrine as equitably as possible. The instant case represents
a step in that direction, and it is hoped that other courts will
follow the example.
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